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CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF DOPING:
BALCO AND BEYOND
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The use by athletes and others I of performance-enhancing substances and
methods that are undetectable or difficult to detect has greatly complicated
efforts to ensure a level playing field of sports competition. Until recently,
anti-doping efforts depended almost entirely on physical testing of athletes and
public education. Unfortunately, a patchwork of regulatory systems, sport by
sport and nation by nation, has suffered from a lack of uniformity and
enforcement measures. Great effort therefore has been put toward
harmonizing rules, procedures for testing, and sanctions on a global basis of
zero tolerance for doping.2 In particular, the World Anti-Doping Code (Code)
and the International Convention Against Doping in Sport3 provide a more
uniform, stable system of control.
If, however, some performance-enhancing substances or methods defy
detection in physical testing, what can be done to protect ethical athletes and
the integrity of competition from the corruption of undetectable doping? The
* Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law; Director, International Programs, Willamette University
College of Law. Professor Nafziger is President of the International Association of Sports Law.
1. As to "others," doping of horses in equestrian competition is also a continuing issue. On
September 5, 2005, the Court of Arbitration for Sport turned down an appeal from a decision of the
International Equestrian Federation that had disqualified Ludger Beerbaum from the 2004 Olympic
Games and thereby denied the German show jumping team a gold medal. The result was to re-award
the gold medal to the United States, the initial silver medalist, and re-award the silver medal to
Sweden and the bronze to Germany. Beerbaum v. FEI, CAS 2005/A/829 (Sept. 5, 2005).
2. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE (2003), [hereinafter CODE]. For a description of the Code, see
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 162-64 (2d ed. 2004).
3. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO),
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST DOPING IN SPORT, ED/2005/CONV-DOP rev.2, adopted
Oct. 19, 2005 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention]. The Convention was adopted unanimously by the
UNESCO General Conference at its 33rd Session. See UNESCO Press Release No. 2005-125, Oct.
20, 2005. The Convention requires States Parties to comply with the principles of the Code, supra
note 2; to support the World Anti-Doping Agency, which administers the Code; and to undertake
educational programs against doping. The Code, however, is not an integral part of the Convention
nor does it create binding obligations under international law for States Parties except as specifically
provided in the text of the Convention.
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problem became serious when the analytical laboratory at the University of
California at Los Angeles (UCLA), charged with examining a substance in the
opening phase of the BALCO controversy, detected a previously undetectable
anabolic steroid, tetrahydrogestrinone (THG). This drug was thought to have
been available for some time to many athletes, including, notably, several
world-class track-and-field champions and baseball stars. Other drugs that
have been undetectable or difficult to detect include anabolic and other
designer steroids (such as what is called "the cream"), modafinil, certain
insulin agents, erythropoietin (EPO), and human growth hormone. These and
other types of doping have stained the reputation of several sports-especially
cycling, track and field, baseball, and swimming-but the problem is more
extensive. Although the full extent of the potential problem is unclear in terms
of both the number of substances that may escape detection and the difficulty
of detection, it became clear that some kind of a response was needed.
The blood booster EPO, which improves endurance by expanding the
oxygen-carrying capacity of blood, has been troublesome in such sports as
cycling and distance running, particularly in the way its testing has been
handled, stored, and documented. Although French scientists developed a test
for it in 2000, the validity of the test is controversial.4 For example, a
controversy in 2005 concerned an expos6 by the French media about 1999
blood samples attributed to the cyclist Lance Armstrong. The expos6
deliberately raised issues of compliance with WADA rules and of due process
but also provoked controversy among readers of the expos6 concerning the
validity of the test itself and related testing procedures and safeguards of
athletes. 5  Of particular note to this article was the apparent origins of
suspicions about Armstrong in the form of oral testimony, much of which was
hearsay, as circumstantial evidence presented in a commercial book.6 Testing
for human growth hormone is also controversial, having been intended for the
2004 Olympic Games but later withdrawn from the 2005 Tour de France
because of questions about the validity of the test. 7
4. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Antidoping Agency Seeks Test for EPO That is Definitive, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at D1.
5. Id. After a storm of protests about the public revelations of the samples by the French sports
daily, L'Equipe, the International Cycling Union announced that it would take no action against
Armstrong but would undertake an investigation into the circumstances by which the controversial
blood samples attributed to Armstrong were tested and the coded (but decodable) results of the testing
revealed, contrary to assurance of anonymity. INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Sept. 10-11, 2005, at 21.
6. See Samuel Abt, Book Has Suspicions On Lance Armstrong, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris),
June 15, 2004, at 6.
7. See Tour de France to Skip Hormone Test, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), June 24, 2005, at S3;
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 20, 2004, at 12.
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Two alternative responses to the problem of undetectable or difficult-to-
detect agents have attracted considerable attention. Both of them depart from
current norms of doping control by relying on circumstantial evidence. The
first alternative involves the use of non-analytical positive evidence. In
particular, the BALCO controversy in the United States, on the eve of the
Athens Games, led to investigation of several world-class athletes. Resulting
charges against several athletes relied on non-analytical positive evidence.
Instead of the results of urinalysis or blood tests, the evidence took the form of
documentation that allegedly indicated purchase or use of undetectable or
difficult-to-detect drugs by the athletes. Arguably, the circumstantial nature of
the evidence, because of its indirectness, may be unreliable and unfair.
A second approach to the problem of undetectable or difficult-to-detect
drugs is athletic profiling. This approach marshals extensive physical
examination of athletes to produce a broad range of physical information that
would form biological profiles. A proposed identity card for each athlete
incorporating this information could then be monitored by anti-doping
agencies for suspicious deviations from the base profiles. Both the
intrusiveness and reliability of this approach are, of course, highly
controversial.
These remarks on such circumstantial evidence of doping are not intended
to be definitive, but rather to provoke critical thinking about the alternatives to
a reliance on hard, laboratory evidence when it is not available in the anti-
doping process. In the future, as gene therapy and other new techniques
become available to athletes, we need to think carefully about whether it will
even be feasible to police sports competition for the use of performance-
enhancing substances and methods; and, if so, how to do so and on the basis of
what forms of evidence.
II. THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE
A. Rule Violations
Under the emerging international sports law, whatever approach is taken
in response to the problem of undetectable or difficult-to-detect drugs must
conform to the World Anti-Doping Code. It is therefore important to
understand a few of its pertinent provisions before turning to the BALCO
controversy.
The World Anti-Doping Code relies on a process of doping control that is
defined to include test distribution planning, sample collection and handling,
2005]
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laboratory analysis, results management, hearings, and appeals. 8 As such, the
Code would not seem to apply to prohibited substances or methods that, by
definition, are not susceptible to laboratory analysis or, at best, are very
difficult to detect by such analysis. And, indeed, it has to be acknowledged
that the problem of undetectable or difficult-to-detect agents burst forth in the
sports arena largely after the Code was drafted.
The Code is nevertheless forward-looking. It therefore provides a set of
rules and principles that are, in fact, applicable to the problem at hand. These
include, first and foremost, eight anti-doping rules violations, namely: the
presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete's
bodily specimen; the use or attempted use of a prohibited substance or a
prohibited method; refusing, failing to submit to, or evading sample collection;
violations of requirements regarding athlete availability for out-of-competition
testing, including missed tests and failures to provide required out-of-
competition information about an athlete's whereabouts; tampering or
attempted tampering with any part of doping control; possession of prohibited
substances and methods; trafficking in them; and administration or attempted
administration of them. 9  Each of these rules is further elaborated and
qualified. Most of them apply, if only indirectly, to the problem of
undetectable or difficult-to-detect doping. As a matter of evidence and
standards of proof, however, four of the prohibitions-use or attempted use,
possession, trafficking, and administration of prohibited substances or
methods-merit particular attention.l 0
1. Use or Attempted Use
The use of prohibited substances or methods is defined to include the
"application, ingestion, injection or consumption by any means whatsoever.""I
This definition is limited to the physical intake of prohibited substances or
employment of prohibited methods and does not seem to contemplate other
practices such as the purchase of substances. Accordingly, it is therefore
8. Id., Definitions: Doping Control, app. 1, at 73.
9. Id. §§ 2.1-8.
10. The definition of a fifth violation, "tampering of attempting to tamper," also might seem
applicable in part: "Altering for an improper purpose or in an improper way; bringing improper
influence to bear; interfering improperly to alter results or prevent normal procedures from
occurring." Id., Definitions: Tampering, app. 1, at 78 (emphasis added). In context and in the light of
other provisions in the Code, however, the term seems to be confined to laboratory testing and
management. The phrase "or prevent normal procedures from occurring" is therefore best interpreted
to refer, restrictively, to actions related to physical testing, laboratory analysis, and physical results
management.
11. Id.§2.2.
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questionable whether circumstantial evidence alone of use or attempted use-
for example, receipts for the purchase of a prohibited substance-would
provide an adequate basis for sanctions under the Code. Moreover, proof of
an attempted use requires a showing of intent on the athlete's part. On the
other hand, the official Comment to the Code makes clear that proof of use
may rely on "admissions, third-party testimony, or other evidence."' 12 It
should also be noted that the Code allows all test samples to be kept eight
years for later analysis and possible sanctioning of athletes.
2. Possession
The term possession, as used in the Code, includes actual physical
possession or constructive possession of a prohibited substance or substances.
The official Comment establishes that steroids found in an athlete's car or
home medicine cabinet under the joint control of an athlete and spouse would
constitute prima facie violations of the Code. 13  The definition further
provides, however, that any person who, "prior to receiving notification of any
kind"'14 of an anti-doping rule violation, takes concrete action to relinquish
possession and renounce previous possession is not subject to an anti-doping
rule violation based solely on possession.
3. Trafficking
One might suppose that trafficking in a prohibited substance or method
would be the most obvious basis for proving a violation of the Code in the
absence of analytic proof from a laboratory. Surprisingly, however, the term
is defined restrictively as an activity to "sell, give, administer, transport, send,
deliver or distribute [an agent] to an athlete either directly or through one or
more third parties."' 15 Apparently, the other side of trafficking-the purchase
or receipt of a prohibited substance by an athlete-is not a violation. In view
of the problem of undetectable or difficult-to-detect agents, it may be
advisable, therefore, to amend the Code to clarify that trafficking is a two-way
street or back alley in which the purchase or receipt of a prohibited substance
also constitutes trafficking. The International Convention Against Doping in
Sport, which will operate as an international treaty binding on States Parties,
offered a particularly good opportunity to make such a change, but it, too,
refers to trafficking in terms of activity directed to athletes.
12. Id. § 2.2.1 Comment.
13. Id., Definitions: Possession Comment, app. 1, at 76.
14. Id., Definitions: Possession, app. 1, at 76-77.
15. Id., Definitions: Trafficking, app. 1, at 78 (emphasis added).
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4. Administration or Attempted Administration
The definition of administration or attempted administration of prohibited
substances or methods is left undefined except as it includes "assisting,
encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity"'
16
in violating an anti-doping rule. Arguably, any athlete who is involved in
administering a prohibited substance or method for his or her benefit would
constitute a violation. On the other hand, the more explicit provisions for
possession and use of a prohibited substance or method would seem to cover
the same practices.
We are left, then, with a set of four rules that either individually or, more
effectively, in the aggregate can be cited as bases for the imposition by
responsible organizations of any of these basic sanctions: disqualification,
provisional suspension, and ineligibility. 17 Given the potential severity of any
of these sanctions, however, the Code's prescriptions for burdens and
standards of proof are critical.
B. Burdens and Standards of Proof
The Code relies on Anti-Doping Organizations, as defined, to initiate,
implement, and enforce the doping control process. These organizations
include all Signatories of the Code, namely, the IOC, IFs, the International
Paralympic Committee, National Olympic Committees, National Paralympic
Committees, Major Event Organizations, National Anti-Doping Organizations,
and the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA).18
In carrying out its responsibilities,
[t]he Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden of establishing
that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred. The standard of proof
shall be whether the Anti-Doping Organization has established an
anti-doping rule violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the
hearing body bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation which
is made. This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere
balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Where the Code places the burden of proof upon the Athlete or other
Person alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule violation to
rebut a presumption or establish specified facts or circumstances, the
16. Id. § 2.8.
17. Id., Definitions: Consequences of Doping Violations, app. 1, at 73.
18. Id., Definitions: Signatories, app. 1, at 72.
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standard of proof shall be by a balance of probability.19
The Code confirms that "[f]acts related to anti-doping rule violations may
be established by any reliable means, including admissions." 20 Two other
rules on methods of establishing facts and presumptions address international
standards for laboratory analysis and departures from them.
Of greatest interest is the standard of "comfortable satisfaction" 21 that is
defined to be "greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."' 22 Thus, the Code adopts a standard whose rigor
lies somewhere between what is normally applied in private law and what is
applied under public (penal or criminal) law. The official Comment notes that
this standard of proof "is comparable to the standard which is applied in most
countries to cases involving professional misconduct. ' 23 The Comment, citing
a Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) decision,24 also observes that the
standard "has been widely applied by courts and tribunals in doping cases." 25
It is therefore a rule of custom in international sports law.
III. NON-ANALYTICAL POSITIVE EVIDENCE
A. The BALCO Controversy
The Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) became the focus in
2004 of a major controversy involving an apparently widespread use of
undetectable or difficult-to-detect agents in sports competition.2 6 BALCO's
role came to light as a result of an anonymous tip to the United States Anti-
Doping Agency (USADA) on June 5, 2003. The tipster claimed that he had
evidence of an undetectable anabolic steroid that BALCO had distributed.
The next day the USDA received an anonymous syringe containing a clear
liquid. After several weeks of testing the liquid, chemists at the Olympic
Analytical Laboratory at UCLA announced that they had identified a new,
difficult-to-detect steroid, which they named tetrahydrogestrinone (THG).
19. Id. § 3.1 (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 3.2.
21. Id. § 3.1.
22. Id.
23. Id. § 3.1 Comment.
24. N.J.Y.W. v. FINA, CAS 98/208 (1998).
25. Id. § 3.1 Comment.
26. See generally Liz Robbins, Even When They Can Run, They Surely Cannot Hide, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, at Sports 4; Jere Longman & Liz Robbins, Top U.S. Sprinter Barred as Drug
Scandal Grows, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at 1. For running commentary on the BALCO
Controversy, see MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), 2003-04, passim.
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The federal Department of Justice and the State of California, where
BALCO is headquartered, launched investigations that culminated on
September 3, 2003 in a raid of BALCO facilities by federal and county agents.
Analysis of documentary and other material seized during the raid led to a
determination by USA Track & Field that four athletes had used THG before
or during the national championships earlier in 2003. Reports also circulated
that four National Football League (NFL) players had tested positive for THG.
It was during this period of time, as the BALCO scandal widened, that MLB
announced that 5-7% of the tests of baseball players were positive, under
MLB's first-ever anti-doping program, which had been established in 2002.
In early 2004 a federal grand jury indicted four persons on charges of
distributing illegal drugs to athletes and money laundering, including
BALCO's president and chief executive officer, its vice-president, a
professional trainer and alleged distributor of prohibited drugs, and a track-
and-field coach. 27 All four pleaded not guilty to distributing steroids to
athletes. 28 Federal indictments were based on some 31,000 pages of evidence.
Congressional hearings in the BALCO controversy also followed.
Additionally, the State of California fined BALCO about three-quarters of a
million dollars for its operation of a licensed clinical lab without proper
personnel, submission of false statements on licensing documents, and
authorization of an unlicensed person to conduct complex testing.29
Records that had been subpoenaed by the United States Senate Commerce
Committee from the Department of Justice were delivered to the USADA. On
the basis of the records, USADA, in turn, launched its own investigations.
These investigations were based not on urinalysis or other physical techniques
of doping control but on non-analytical positive evidence of e-mail
communications, calendars, drug schedules revealing evidence of the use by
particular athletes of performance-enhancing substances, personal checks from
athletes to BALCO, and other extrinsic paper evidence.30
This evidence, which was generally coded and therefore cryptic, indicated
sales by BALCO of doping substances to several prominent athletes,
27. Indictment, United States v. Conte, (N.D. Cal. 2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/sports/usconte21lO4ind.pdf.
28. See BALCO Chemist Is Subject of Federal Raid, Paper Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at
B17. BALCO's President, Victor Conte, was sentenced to four months in prison and four months
more in home confinement. CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 20, 2005, at 20. Further law
enforcement measures, grand jury investigations, and indictments were continuing as of the date of
this news item.
29. See MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), July 13, 2004.
30. See Jere Longman, Jones's Lawyers Challenge Evidence, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), May
27, 2004, at 22.
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particularly in baseball and track and field. One of them, Kelli White,
promptly admitted her use of prohibited substances and was suspended from
competition for a period of two years. 31 Before the Athens Games in August
2004, five other athletes-four Americans (Michelle Collins, Chryste Gaines,
Alvin Harrison, and world-record sprinter Tim Montgomery) and one British
sprinter-were charged by USADA with violations of the anti-doping rules
and faced suspensions from competition for a minimum of two years each.
One of the Americans, Alvin Harrison, who subsequently admitted to doping,
received a four-year suspension of eligibility, effectively ending his
competitive career. 32 A second athlete, Tim Montgomery, admitted that he
had used human growth hormone and THG. Three of the athletes appealed the
USADA actions to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), with inconclusive
outcomes. Several other athletes subsequently received suspensions from
competition for using THG or modafinil, both of which are drugs closely
identified with BALCO as a source, and nikethamide, a stimulant. WADA's
investigations continued, casting suspicion on several athletes, especially 2000
Olympic champion Marion Jones, and a shadow over the entire sports arena.
Although the BALCO controversy centered on track-and-field athletes, it
extended to football and baseball players as well. In particular, testimony by
baseball stars Barry Bonds, Jason Giambi, and Gary Sheffield highlighted the
mounting controversy.
B. The Sanctioning Process and Its Discontents
The World Anti-Doping Code, despite its impulse of harmonization, does
not require anti-doping organizations to adopt a single results management and
hearing process. 33 Each signatory organization can design its own process so
long as it satisfies the Code's general requirements. The USADA sanctioning
process involves four steps: notification to an athlete of a potential violation;
examination of the alleged violation and recommendation after a hearing by an
independent review board of whether USADA should proceed with a formal
charge; acceptance or rejection by the athlete of any USADA-imposed
sanction; and an opportunity for the athlete to contest the sanction before,
according to his choice, either the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or
CAS. 3
4
31. See Longman & Robbins, supra note 26; Dick Patrick, Runner to Help in Drug Probe, USA
TODAY, May 20, 2004, at IA.
32. See Elliott Almond, Alvin Harrison Accepts Ban, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), Oct. 20,
2004, at 4D.
33. CODE, supra note 2, Introduction Comment.
34. UNITED STATES ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, PROTOCOL FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING
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The BALCO-related sanctions have been challenged along four lines.
First, as a factual matter, it is claimed that the often deliberately coded and
otherwise cryptic communications that constitute the primary evidence against
the athletes does not explicitly mention them by name or confirm their actual
possession, use, or attempted use of prohibited substances. Even large checks
to BALCO from implicated athletes have been controversial. Second, it is
claimed that during the BALCO controversy USADA unfairly changed its
standard of proof of doping from the strict "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard that is identified with penal law to the more relaxed "comfortable
satisfaction" standard that is found in the World Anti-Doping Code. Also, it is
claimed that the "comfortable satisfaction" standard of proof is too new to be
applicable to activity and performances before the Code became effective.
Third, it is claimed that in any event the "comfortable satisfaction" standard is
too relaxed to protect athletes' rights of due process. Although the USADA
process is not a criminal one, the consequences of a doping infraction are
essentially of a penal nature and therefore merit a high standard of proof.
Finally, as a constitutional matter, it is claimed that the records that
Congress had subpoenaed from the Justice Department and delivered to
USADA were fruit of a poisoned tree. The argument is that the federal raid of
BALCO and other law-enforcement actions that produced the damaging
records violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which protects all persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.35 To be
sure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do authorize judges to release
grand jury testimony under limited circumstances, normally to facilitate
another federal or state investigation. As a non-governmental body, however,
USADA would not qualify as a basis for such inter-governmental cooperation.
The Rules and judicial precedent have also established that courts may release
grand jury information whenever there is "particularized need" for the
testimony that is greater than the protection of a grand jury's secrecy. In
evaluating this constitutional challenge, it might be argued that the integrity of
sport created such a particularized need for the BALCO-related
communications. On the other hand, Congress seems to have supplied the
information to USADA on a carte blanche, or generalized rather than
(2004).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. On a related issue, Representative John Conyers has called for
an investigation by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice to determine the nature of
USADA's involvement in the BALCO criminal investigation and what documents it received; why
federal agents did not use a government facility to analyze lab reports and materials taken during the
raid of BALCO; and whether the Justice Department sought a government lab for analysis to confirm
UCLA's findings that THG is an anabolic steroid (and if not, why not). MERCURY NEWS (San Jose,
Cal.), Sept. 17, 2004.
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particularized, basis.
The debate about appropriate standards of proof highlights the general'
issue of reliance on circumstantial evidence within the anti-doping process.
The difficult question is: in the interest of a level playing field for all athletes,
to what extent should we run the risk of abandoning a traditional reliance on
hard laboratory data to justify the imposition of essentially penal sanctions
against athletes?
IV. ATHLETIC PROFILING
A more radical approach to the problem of undetectable or difficult-to-
detect drugs would be to require profiling of all athletes as a basis for their
eligibility in international competition. 36 Accordingly, it has been suggested
that all aspiring athletes should undergo detailed physical examinations
periodically. On this basis, each athlete would receive an identity card or
computer file that would include an index of physical strength, capacity to
absorb oxygen and eliminate lactic acid, red blood-cell count, hormone level,
and other physical characteristics. Significant deviations over time would then
trigger specific investigations of suspected drug use, although it is unclear to
what extent a changed profile might in itself constitute valid evidence of
doping or at least a presumption of doping.
The concept of athletic profiling appears to have been inspired by a
response to a doping crisis within the. Tour de France of cycling. The
embarrassed French government responded by requiring comprehensive
annual examinations of cyclists seeking to compete in the annual competition.
This requirement subsequently was extended by the International Cycling
Union to all cyclists for certification of eligibility in international competition.
Initially, the resulting data were to have been used only for the statistical
purpose of revealing the extent of the problem, overall, and trends related to it.
The data were not intended to be used to provide evidence against particular
cyclists. An individualized compilation and broader use of such data as an
integral part of the anti-doping process, with sanctions against alleged
violators, might seem highly intrusive. But it is likely that such measures are
inevitable in all sports, contributing as they do to both the "comfortable
satisfaction" of reviewing bodies and, temporarily, the uncomfortable
dissatisfaction of the athletes themselves until testing becomes fully uniform
and routine.
36. See, e.g., Ian Austen, Athletic Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
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V. CONCLUSION
The new specter of undetectable or difficult-to-detect doping, highlighted
by the BALCO controversy in the United States, serves as a reminder that we
have entered a Brave New World of doping and doping control in sports.
In responding to old as well as new threats to the integrity of sports
competition, the World Anti-Doping Code, as newly ircorporated into the
International Convention Against Doping in Sport, provides a process and set
of rules for harmonizing and enforcing a global regime. It is difficult,
however, for the legal imagination to keep up with scientific ingenuity. The
problem of circumstantial evidence of anti-doping rule violations is a current
example of this dilemma for the legal profession. The feasibility of gene
therapy 37 and other cutting-edge techniques for enhancing athletic
performance underscores the need to achieve a more detailed global
consensus, consistent with international sports law, on the appropriate
elements of the evolving anti-doping process. In the modern era, the rules of
the process, if they are fair, can best protect the rules of the game.
37. See H. Lee Sweeney, Gene Doping, SCI. AM., July 2004, at 63.
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